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Abstract 
The main hypothesis which is tested in this paper is that voters who experience more fear are more 
likely to vote for radical right parties. The underlying idea of this hypothesis is that important 
explanations mentioned in the literature about the radical right vote are based on the experience of 
some sort of economic or symbolic threat. Research has shown that fear can influence people's 
decision-making and electoral behavior. Different analyses conducted in the paper support the claim 
that fear as a personal characteristic plays a role on its own when it comes to voting for radical right 
parties. While the measurement of fear was not optimal, the results show that further research 
should take the role of fear into account. These studies also have the task to find better ways to 
measure fear to look at the relationship in more detail.  
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Introduction 
After the Second World War the extreme right and their ideas were - for obvious reasons - de-
legitimized. Therefore, the extreme right was largely insignificant until the 1970s. In the mid-1980s 
through 'the development of a new, innovative master frame (...) the extreme right was able to 
escape marginalization' (Rydgren, 2005: 414). This new frame combined 'ethnonationalist 
xenophobia based on the doctrine of ethnopluralism with anti-political establishment populism' 
(Rydgren, 2005: 432). In 1984 the French Front National was the first party which gained success with 
this new master frame. This success led to the adaption of the new frame by parties in other 
countries and a new 'party family' emerged (Rydgren, 2005). 
 In this paper I use the term radical right parties to refer to this group of parties, however in 
the literature there is no consensus about the name which is given to this party family. These parties 
are also called extreme right parties (e.g. Carter, 2005), populist right parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008) or 
anti-immigrant parties (e.g. Fennema, 1997; Van der Brug et al., 2000). I use the term radical right 
party because this is the most often used term (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 474). According to 
Rydgren (2007) the use of 'radical' in the name of this party family is better than 'extreme' because 
these parties do not oppose to democracy as an idea. He reserves the term extreme for organizations 
who operate outside the democratic political institutions.  
 Radical right parties have received much attention in scholarly literature the last decades. 
One of the relevant questions is why people vote for radical right parties. The main focus of previous 
research has been on social and demographic background characteristics of those voters (e.g. 
Lubbers et al., 2002; Van Gent et al., 2013), their anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2008; 
Rydgren, 2008), anti-establishment attitudes (Rooduijn, 2013) and the experience of economic 
difficulties (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002). A common thread among many of these explanations is the 
perception of some economic or symbolic threat. This - possible - underlying dimension of fear as a 
personal characteristic has received much less attention. Interest in emotions within the field of 
political psychology is relatively new, but the amount of literature which shows evidence that 
emotions shape political outcomes is rapidly growing. The consequences of emotions for voter 
decision-making in election campaigns is one of these topics (Brader and Marcus, 2013). Several 
studies confirmed that threat relates to right-wing attitudes (Onreat et al., 2013: 791). However, 
when it comes to voting for radical right parties the role of emotions - and in particularly the role of 
fear - did not get direct attention. In other words, fear is tested indirectly through for example anti-
immigrant attitudes, but not directly as a predictor on its own. Given the obvious goal of the radical 
right rhetoric - to induce fear and anxiety among the public - this is surprising. 
 Fear, which follows from cultural and economic threats due to immigration, is an emotion 
which could potentially facilitate voting for radical right-wing parties. It is therefore valuable to test 
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whether fear has a direct influence on voting for radical right parties because if the hypothesis would 
be confirmed this would mean that current explanations for the radical right vote have an important 
underlying dimension. My research question therefore will be: Does a general feeling of fear 
facilitate voting for radical right-wing parties, and is this a specific characteristic for radical right party 
voters? I intend to answer this question in a study based on data from the European Values Study 
2008 for radical right parties in seventeen European countries. 
 I will first discuss the most important explanations for the radical right vote, followed by a 
discussion how fear could have an effect for the radical right vote. Next I will explain how I test the 
role of fear. In the last two sections of this paper the results of the analysis and a conclusion are 
given. 
Explanations for the radical right vote 
Anti-immigrant attitudes and levels of immigration 
Authors who use the term anti-immigrant parties often use this term due to the importance of the 
anti-immigrant rhetoric used by these parties (e.g. Fennema, 1997) and the fact that grievance over 
immigration is the only characteristic which unites all these parties (Ivarslfaten, 2008: 17-18). 
Furthermore, anti-immigration positions ‘dominates the images voters have of these parties’ 
(Rydgren, 2008: 740). While it is not the only attitudinal factor which matters, anti-immigrant 
attitudes are perhaps the most import ones and 'even if not all voters who hold anti-immigration 
attitudes vote for a new radical-right wing party, most voters who do vote for such parties hold such 
attitudes' (Rydgren, 2007: 250). 
In an article about the electoral impact of the British National Party (BNP) at the 2010 British 
General election Cutts and Goodwin found that people who thought that the most important issue 
was immigration were five times more likely to vote for the British National Party (2014: 110). 
Different other studies have also shown that anti-immigrant attitudes facilitate voting for radical-
right parties (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Zhirkov, 2014). These anti-immigrant attitudes 
should not be mistaken as a result from xenophobic attitudes, even if radical-right parties have 
xenophobic political programmes. Much more important as a predictor for the radical right vote is 
immigration scepticism (Rydgren, 2008: 760). 
Zhirkov summarizes two interpretations which could explain anti-immigrant attitudes in 
advanced Western democracies and Western Europe in particular. The first interpretation is based 
on the classic work The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950), and essentially argues that 
‘anti-immigrant attitudes can be seen as an instance of general xenophobia and intolerance related 
to a wider authoritarian syndrome’ (Zhirkov, 2014: 287)1. The second interpretation puts emphasis 
                                                          
1
 This work shows the importance of a more psychological approach to explain the radical right vote. 
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on perceived economic conflicts and explains anti-immigrants positions ‘in terms of realistic group 
conflict theory and competition over jobs between immigrants and natives’ (Zhirkov, 2014: 287). Also 
with regard to other scarce resources such as housing, welfare state benefits, or even the marriage 
market voters could prefer to reduce competition in these areas (Rydgren, 2007: 250).  
The latter explanation, however, might be too simplistic. In a study on the success of the 
Belgium Vlaams Blok, Coffé et al. (2007) for example found that there is a different relationship 
between population from Maghreb and Turkey and Vlaams Blok vote share on the one hand and 
population from other countries and Vlaams Blok vote share on the other hand. The first has a 
(highly significant) positive correlation, while the second has a (non-significant) negative correlation. 
This suggests that it is not the overall number of presence of foreigners which matters but that the 
religious or ethnic origin of immigrants, especially for those from an Islamic culture (2007: 149, 153), 
makes a difference. This relates to a discussion about the relationship between intergroup threat and 
out-group attitudes and the interplay between realistic group conflict theory and symbolic racism 
theory. I will return to this discussion in the next section about the role of fear. 
While at the individual-level the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes is fairly robust, at the 
aggregate level results of the relationship between the (relative) number of immigrants living in a 
country and vote share for radical right parties show mixed results. Only a small amount of 
researchers found a positive correlation between both (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 483; see for 
example Knigge, 1998). Newman found that the real or perceived increase of immigrants in one’s 
environment can trigger the perception of threat if the initial number of immigrants was low 
(Newman, 2013). 
Based on the realistic group conflict theory the expectation would be that in constituencies 
or countries with relative more immigrants more people would vote for radical right parties, but 
research on this topic shows only weak support for this theory (Rydgren, 2007: 250). One of the 
reasons therefore is that most competition over these scarce resources is not national, but local. But 
even when this is taken into account support for the theory is not strong. Rydgren shows that in only 
in the Netherlands and Denmark voters who 'live in immigration-dense areas  [are] significantly more 
likely to vote for the radical right' (Rydgren, 2008: 761). In Austria, Belgium, France and Norway he 
did not find such effects. 
At the individual level the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and the radical right 
vote however seems clear, so I expect to find that anti-immigrant attitudes in my model have a 
positive influence on the radical right vote and that there is no reason to expect that there are 
countries were this relationship is different since anti-immigrant attitudes are the uniting 
characteristic of radical right parties (Ivarslfaten, 2008). 
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Economic perceptions and conditions 
Economic concerns are not limited to competition with immigrants. The perception of economic 
problems in general and the threat of losing one's job facilitates voting for radical right-wing parties. 
This applies, of course, also and especially to those already without a job (Lubbers et al., 2002; 
Steininger & Rotte, 2009). This is related to the relative deprivation thesis, which has mostly been 
operationalized in economic terms. Relative deprivation occurs when someone compares his or her 
own current situation in a negative way with the past or with other groups (Rydgren, 2008). Although 
a negative evaluation of someone's own economic situation does seem to have a positive influence 
on the radical right vote, a bad economic situation does not automatically lead to an increase in 
votes for radical right parties. It might well be that in times of economic prosperity other issues than 
the economy, such as for example anti-immigrant issues, are more salient. Therefore radical right 
parties might be more successful when socioeconomic issues are less important (Hofstadter, 2002; 
cited in Rydgren, 2008). 
 At the aggregate level, however, some researchers found a negative effect between 
unemployment levels and voting for radical right-wing parties (see for example Lubbers et al., 2002; 
Knigge, 1998). This seems to be counterintuitive but 'it could be that people in these circumstances 
are afraid to lose what they have gained in times of economic prosperity' (Lubbers et al., 2002: 371) 
and therefore vote for such parties. Such counterintuitive findings suggest that it is less the actual 
experience that matters but a more diffuse experience of fear and anxiety caused by a perceived 
threat. This fits well with the hypothesis that a general feeling of fear facilitates voting for radical 
right parties, but I will come back to this topic later. 
The radical right vote as a protest vote 
A core message of populist parties is the rejection of the political establishment, both parties and 
politicians. Especially voters who are disappointed by and cynical about the traditional parties and 
who do not feel represented by them anymore, are supporters of populist parties. Also voters who 
have lower trust and confidence in democratic institutions and who are dissatisfied with how 
democracy works are more likely to vote for radical right parties (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002; 
Norris, 2005). In other words, according to radical right voters ''the established order' has no idea of 
what ordinary people find important and only think about their own interests' (Rooduijn, 2013: 82). 
In a study which focused on the electoral performances of the Dutch populist parties in 2006 and 
2010 Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) showed that also policy preferences and party leader 
evaluation influence voting for populist parties. On these two explanations voters for populist parties 
do not differ from voters for mainstream parties. The main difference between both groups of voters 
are the protest attitudes from voters for radical right parties. Voters for populist parties have 
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stronger protest attitudes. Schumacher and Rooduijn further found that from both populist parties 
they analyzed 'only the PVV has pure protest voters, which means that it is purely the anti-elitist 
message of the party that sways these voters' (2013: 132). This was the only radical right party they 
analyzed and shows support for the thesis that radical right parties attract pure protest voters. 
However, while radical right parties are often seen as protest parties, protest attitudes do not unite 
these parties to the same extent as anti-immigrant attitudes do (Ivarsflaten, 2008: 18). While 
basically all radical right parties attract voters with anti-immigrant attitudes, not all radical right 
parties attract protest voters. Also Van der Brug et al. (2000) draw the conclusion that voters for 
radical right-wing parties should in the first place be considered as policy voters. Thus, there are 
studies which conform the idea of radical right voters as protest voters and there are studies which 
reject this idea. An explanation therefore could be that the radical right vote is much more a protest 
vote when the radical right party first enters the political arena. Those who vote for a radical right 
party as a protest vote tend to go back to their original party of preference after one or two elections, 
leaving only the voters who identify themselves with the ideology of the radical right party as 
supporters of these parties (Rydgren, 2008). Therefore one could expect that in countries with 
relatively younger radical right parties (such as Alliance for the Future of Austria in Austria, Ataka in 
Bulgaria, Party for Freedom and Proud of the Netherlands in the Netherlands) the effect of protest 
attitudes on the radical right vote is stronger than in countries with radical right parties who already 
are longer represented in parliament. In general the expectation is that voters who have lower trust 
in democratic institutions are more likely to vote for radical right parties. 
Nationalism and European integration 
Another key characteristics of radical right parties is their nationalism. It is however a specific form of 
nationalism which applies to these parties. This form of nationalism 'emphasizes the antagonistic 
relationship between the Good nation and the Evil outsiders' (Rooduijn, 2014: 82). According to 
Mudde this form of nationalism can be referred to as nativism. This type of nationalism can be 
defined as 'an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the 
native group ("the nation") and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally 
threatening to the homogeneous nation-state' (Mudde, 2007: 19) and forms a combination of 
nationalism and xenophobia (Mudde, 2007: 24). The most important and threatening 'non-native 
element' is formed by people who are considered as not belonging to the nation and could be 
'immigrants or people of another race or religion' (Rooduijn, 2014: 82). Nationalism can also be seen 
as a result of globalization and the of the loss of identity related to it. The will to regain that identity 
makes that people  turn to nationalism to strengthen their bond with the nation again (Koopmans et 
al., 2005; cited in Rydgren, 2008). 
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 Related to this nativist character is the often Eurospectic view of radical right parties. Given 
the threat that is perceived by non-native elements in this ideology, it is not surprising that also 
European integration is considered as a negative trend. An example of such a party is the British 
National Party. Cutts and Goodwin found Eurosceptic voters are more likely to vote for the BNP than 
voters who are in favor of closer cooperation with the European Union (Cutts and Goodwin, 2014: 
110). Radical Right parties are opposed to admitting new members to the European Union and 
further economic and political integration. These conflicts however tend to focus on social values and 
symbolic issues, rather than specific economic or policy issues. 
 Therefore I expect that both nationalistic people and those who are against (further) 
European integration are more likely to vote for radical right parties. Although there might be a 
difference between the effect of these predictors in different countries. These effects might be 
stronger in countries who experience more disadvantages of globalization and European integration 
and less stronger in countries who experience more advantages of globalization and European 
integration. 
Ideology and values 
The ideological location of radical right wing parties is - as the name suggests - on the far right of the 
political spectrum. This means that voters for radical right wing parties tend to be more conservative, 
in favor of the status quo and opposed to social change. Therefore, these voters among other things 
consider the values of postmodernization as a threat to ‘traditional values and national culture’ 
(Zhirkov, 2014: 288). Postmodernization has winners and losers and those who are considered to be 
"modernization losers" want to undo the change that is associated with modernization (Minkenberg, 
2003) because they have the chance of becoming ‘superfluous and useless for society’ (Betz, 1994: 
32). These "modernization losers" in 'practical terms has usually come to refer to unemployed people 
and unskilled workers threatened by unemployment in the near future' (Rydgren, 2008). 
Ideology in this sense is associated with the nativist character of radical right parties 
described above. Furthermore, parties from this party group share 'an authoritarian outlook (...) [and] 
aim for a society that is strictly ordered, and therefore emphasizes the importance of law and order' 
(Rooduijn, 2013: 82). Political conservatism can also be considered as motivated social cognition. 
Conservatism is here related to 'dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, openness to experience, 
mortality salience, system instability (...) uncertainty avoidance, integrative complexity, needs for 
order, structure and closure, and fear of threat in general' (Jost et al., 2003: 366). Conservatism in 
this respect is a way to deal with uncertainty and fear. Also in this respect we can thus see that 
conservatism might lead to radical right voting, but that conservatism is a result of the experience of 
fear. 
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Socio-demographical characteristics of the radical  right voter 
Previous research has shown that unemployed, less educated, non-religious, younger and male2 
voters are more likely to vote for radical right-wing parties in general (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002; Van 
Gent et al., 2013; Zhirkov, 2014). The effects of unemployment on the radical right vote already have 
been discussed above. A further remark has to be made about the education level of radical right 
voters. While Lubbers et al. (2002) found that lower educated people are overrepresented under 
radical right voters, other studies find that 'the radical right receives its strongest support from the 
mid-school stratum' (Rydgren, 2008: 249). Most of these socio-demographic characteristics lack an 
underlying theory. I will include these factors as additional predictors and treat them as control 
variables. 
The role of fear 
A common thread among the reviewed explanations above is the perception of some economic, 
cultural or symbolic threat. Given the obvious goal of the radical right rhetoric - to induce fear and 
anxiety among the public - it is surprising that it has not been tested before if the experience of fear 
has a direct influence on voting for radical right parties. Certainly now the amount of literature which 
shows evidence that emotions shape political outcomes is rapidly growing (Brader and Marcus, 2013). 
Emotional reactions can be conceptually classified in various ways. The most recent 
approaches can be classified as 'neural process theories'. In these theories three dimensions of 
affective appraisal are considered to be important. Also the theory of affective intelligence, 'the most 
prevalent theoretical formulation in political psychology' (Brader and Marcus, 2013) has adopt these 
three dimensions. These three dimensions focus on enthusiasm, anxiety and anger. In this study I 
focus on fear and anxiety since these are "defensive" emotions (Brader and Marcus, 2013: 177). It is 
precisely this defensive reaction against a specific threat which provide a link to the explanatory 
factors discussed earlier. 
Fear is one of the most studied emotions and closely related with anxiety. Some scholars argue 
there are differences between both. For example the distinction between generalized anxiety 
disorders and specific fears made by clinical psychologists (see Brader and Marcus, 2013). However, 
the terms are used interchangeably by most political psychologists (Brader and Marcus, 2013: 177), 
which is what I will do in this paper. Fear is considered as ‘a product of an emotional system (…) that 
monitors the environment for potential threats and adapts behavior accordingly. (…) [It] motivates 
(…) risk-aversive behavior, including actions aimed at prevention and protection, conciliatory acts, 
hiding, and flight’ (Brader and Marcus, 2013: 178). One of the many events which can activate fear 
are “stereotypic portrayals of threatening out-groups” (Brader et al., 2008, cited in Brader and 
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 However, 'the reason for this has hardly been theorized and further analysed' (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007: 483). 
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Marcus, 2013). 
In a meta-analytic review Riek et al. describe the relationship between intergroup threat and 
out-group attitudes. They observe a shift from two competing theories towards a more integrated 
approach. At first realistic group conflict theory (RGCT) and symbolic racism theory where two 
competing theories. The RGCT described a process in which two groups had to compete for scarce 
resources. When this is the case, in-group solidarity may be increased, which leads to a larger 
distinction between in-group and out-group and intergroup hostility. It is even less important if the 
self-interest of a member of the group is threatened directly. A member of the group can also 
perceive a threat when his or hers self-interest is not threatened directly but the interest of the 
group is threatened (Riek et al., 2006: 336-337; see also Sherif & Sherif, 1969 and Bobo, 1983). This is 
related to the earlier mentioned relationship between economic perceptions and the radical right 
vote. In other words, the findings of Lubbers et al. (2002) that people seem to have a defensive 
reaction to 'protect' their jobs by voting for radical right parties when the feel threatened by out-
groups. 
On the other hand, the symbolic racism theory described a process were racism did not results 
from competition over scarce resources but from conflicting values and beliefs. When members of 
one group perceive a larger gap between their own values and the values of another group, this may 
lead to increased negative out-group attitudes (Riek et al., 2006: 337-338). This approach seems 
more related to the anti-immigrant attitudes radical right voters have. 
While these two views were considered as competing at first, more recently they are seen as 
complementary. In this view it is not only competition over scarce resources or value conflict which 
influence negative out-group attitudes, but a combination of both (Riek et al., 2006; McLaren, 2001; 
Wilson, 2001). At the end of their review Riek et al. concluded that integrative frameworks are 
indeed 'advantageous relative to examining each threat type separately' (Riek et al., 2006: 345). 
However there are still uncertainties since it is difficult to know exactly the direction of causality 
between (perceived) threat and negative attitudes. Experimental studies could give a better insight in 
this relationship (Riek et al., 2006), however that is beyond the scope of this paper. This 
complementary view and the related complexity shows perhaps also why some studies on why 
people vote for radical right parties found counterintuitive or contradictory results, because the 
focus often on one of these theories, while the interaction between both also seems important. It 
can also account for the findings of Coffé et al. (2007), since the symbolic racism theory can explain 
why it is only the presence of a specific group of foreigners which leads to voting for radical right 
parties.  
Radical right parties often use a kind of rhetoric which focuses on threats resulting from both 
competition over scarce resources and value conflict. Onraet et al. (2013) found that at the national 
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level there is a positive relationship between threat indicators (for example inflation, unemployment 
and life expectancy) and right-wing attitudes. According to Hatemi et al. ‘individuals with a higher 
degree of social fear have more negative out-group opinions, which, in this study, manifest as anti-
immigration and prosegregation attitudes’ (2013, 279). Social fear, according to psychological 
theories, can arise when people ‘who are naturally more prone to insecure attachments to others, 
and thus disproportionately fear the loss of such attachments, are also more prone to being anxious 
of new people and novel situations that might threaten those relationships’ (Hatemi et al., 2013: 
280). Thus, the goal of the rhetoric used by radical right parties is to create a feeling of fear for such 
threats by those voters who are sensitive for such a rhetoric. The strategy used by radical right 
parties - offering easy 'solutions' for the perceived threats - can be particularly successful if they can 
activate existing negative group stereotypes (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008). 
Fear might also reflect a more fundamental personal predisposition for anxiety. It is 
increasingly clear that “fear constitutes both a genetically informed, stable, but malleable trait-based 
disposition, as well as a transitory state-based response that can be elicited or manipulated by 
environmental conditions“ (Hatemi et al. 2013: 280). Thus, fearful reactions can also have a 
genetically informed cause. Fear is also associated with political conservatism and extremism (Jost et 
al, 2007), which can arise from uncertainty avoidance and threat management. 
Based on these arguments, one would expect that people who experience fear or are sensitive 
to the induction of fear are more responsive to the rhetoric which is used by radical right parties. 
That’s why I expect that voters who experience more fear are more likely to vote for radical right 
parties. 
Methodology 
To test these explanations I will use two multilevel logistic regression models. A multilevel model 
makes it possible to account for methodological details and use predictors from different levels. The 
model in this study has two levels. The first level of this model will contain individual predictors and 
the second level contains predictors at the country level. I use a logistic regression model since the 
dependent variable is dichotomous. I use two models to contrast radical right voters with both other 
party voters (model 1) and people who said they would not vote (model 2). There are two reasons to 
use two models instead of one. First, if one model would be used and in this model radical right 
voters were contrasted with both voters for other parties and people who would not vote at the 
same time it would not be possible to say if fear is a unique characteristic for radical right voters. If 
the influence of fear in this model would have been positive, it could just as well be because voters in 
general experience more fear than people who do not vote. Therefore in the first model radical right 
voters are only contrasted with voters for other parties. Second, the second model is used to make it 
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possible to also say something about the difference between voters for radical right parties and 
people who would not vote. 
The data for the individual level will be obtained from the European Values Study (EVS) 2008. 
Except for Finland (internet panel) and Sweden (postal survey) this study uses face-to-face interviews. 
A  basic English questionnaire was translated into other languages. In some cases country specific 
questions were asked, but they are of no relevance for this study. 
Case selection 
Seventeen countries will be included in the 
analysis (see table 1). These countries are 
included because they have at least one 
radical-right wing party based on a list of 
radical right-wing parties from Zirkov (2014), 
Werts et al. (2013) and expert surveys given 
in the documentation of the EVS3 (selected 
radical right parties are shown in table 1). 
Another possibility would be to include only 
countries were radical right-wing parties are 
successful. However, this would lead to a 
biased case selection. Given this selection 
of countries the initial sample size is 26.352. 
Including multiple countries has as an 
advantage that it is possible to say 
something about the relationship between 
fear and voting for the whole radical right 
party 'family' instead of the relationship 
between fear and only one specific party. 
The dependent variables 
As discussed above I will conduct two 
multilevel logistic regression analyses to 
compare radical right wing voters with 
other party voters and citizens who abstain. The dependent variable for the first model is if a 
respondent would vote for a radical right-wing party. In the EVS respondents were asked for which 
                                                          
3
 Based on these sources three other countries could also have been included: Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. However, it was not possible to identify the radical right voters in Sweden and the United Kingdom, 
since these were not (individually) included in the questionnaire. For Norway, see footnote 4. 
Table 1. Selected countries and parties 
Country Radical right-wing parties 
Austria Freedom Party of Austria 
Alliance for the Future of Austria 
Belgium * 
 -  Flanders 
 
Vlaams Belang 
 -  Wallonia National Front 
Bulgaria Ataka 
Denmark Danish People's Party 
Finland True Finns 
France National Front 
National Republican Movement 
Germany Republikaner 
National Democratic Party 
German People's Party 
Greece LAOS 
Hungary Miép 
 Jobbik 
Italy Lega Nord 
Fiamma Tricolore 
Netherlands Party for Freedom 
Proud of the Netherlands 
Poland LPR 
Romania PRM 
Slovakia SNS 
Slovenia SNS 
Switzerland Swiss People's Party 
Swiss Democrats 
Federal Democratic Union 
Freedom Party 
Ticino League 
Turkey MHP 
* I will use Flanders and Wallonia as two different 
‘countries’ in my analysis. 
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party they would vote if there 'would be a general election tomorrow'. Those respondents who said 
that they would vote for one of the parties mentioned in table 1 are coded with a 1 and respondents 
who said they would vote for another party are coded as a 0. The dependent variable for the second 
analysis is also a dichotomous variable which distinguish voters for radical right parties (coded as 1) 
and citizens who answered they would not vote if elections were held (coded as 0). 
 Self-reported vote is in theory not the only possible dependent variable. Also evaluation 
scores by voters for radical right parties would be an option. The use of evaluation scores make it 
possible to measure the relationship between all voters and their attitude towards radical right 
parties directly. Together with a large range of possible answers a this could give possibilities to look 
in more detail to this relationship. Furthermore, if both linear regression models with evaluation 
scores and logistic regression models with vote intention are used and results show the same pattern 
this gives more weight to the conclusions. However, evaluation questions were not asked in the EVS 
and therefore I will only use vote intentions. This is not per se a bad solution, but if evolution scores 
also could have been used it would just have mean I had some more options for my analysis. 
Measuring fear 
At the individual level the - for the goal of this study - most important predictor is 'fear'. This 
predictor will be based on five questions from the EVS which are about fear for different phenomena. 
These five items could be considered as possible threats. If respondents perceive these threats, these 
treats can induce fear. As discussed earlier this fear could both be more genetically informed as well 
as politically motivated. Important is that respondents were asked whether they were afraid of a 
certain issues. Based on these five questions a fear scale will be made which will be used to analyze 
the influence of fear. Respondents were asked whether they were afraid of4: 
1. The loss of social security; 
2. The loss of national identity and culture; 
3. (Country) paying more and more to the European Union; 
4. A loss of power in the world for (country); 
5. The loss of jobs in (country). 
 
For each of these five items respondents could answer on a 10 point scale, ranging from 1 (very 
much afraid) to 10 (not afraid at all). For the fear scale these variables will be recoded in such a way 
that they range from not afraid at all (1) to very much afraid (10). 
Based on a principal component analysis and a reliability analysis combining these five items 
into one fear scale can be justified. The principal component analysis (PCA) showed only one 
                                                          
4
 These fear questions were asked in all countries except Norway. Therefore Norway is excluded from the 
analysis. In Turkey only the third questions was not asked. From all respondents only 2.7% did not answer any 
of these questions. 94.1 % of the respondents answered at least four questions. 
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component with an eigenvalue above one (Eigenvalue = 3.253 with 65.1 percent explained variance). 
The results of a reliability analysis with the five items also supported the use of a single fear scale (α 
= .865). Excluding one of the items would have lowered Cronbach’s Alpha. In appendix A results of 
the same tests are shown per country. These results show support for a single fear scale in all 
countries. Differences between the countries are only small and for all countries only one component 
and a high Cronbach's Alpha was found. 
For each respondent the scores off all the questions they answered will be add up and dived by 
the numbers of questions the respondent answered. Thus, the fear scale which will be used in my 
model is based on these five items and measured on a 10 point scale. 
It should be noted that this way of measuring fear is not automatically the best way. One of 
the reasons therefore is that not all persons have the same conceptualization about specific 
emotions (Brader and Marcus, 2013: 187), which makes measuring emotions trough surveys more 
difficult and could lead to validity problems. Furthermore, the questions which are used to create the 
fear scale might have a right-wing bias. This would of course be a problem. But since some of the 
(more economic) items are certainly not only related to radical right parties and the strong support 
for one fear scale, this does not seem to be a problem. Therefore, to get a first impression about the 
effect of fear on voting for radical right-wing parties and the fact that PCA and reliability analysis 
show very strong support for a single fear scale the way fear is operationalized in this study is 
sufficient. But in the conclusion this reservations should be kept in mind. 
Other explanatory variables at individual level 
Next to the fear predictor other predictors mentioned in previous research will be included in both 
models. At the individual level sixteen other variables to control for other explanations for radical-
right wing voting based on previous research will be included, these can be obtained from the EVS 
2008 dataset. First, four variables are included which measure anti-immigrant attitudes. These are all 
measured on a 10 point scale. The questions and the possible answers for these variables are given in 
table 2. 
 
Table 2. Anti-immigrant attitudes 
Predictor Question Scale * 
Jobs Immigrants take away jobs from 
[nationality] 
01 - Do not take away 
10 - Take away 
Cultural life Immigrants undermine [country] 
cultural life 
01 - Do not undermine cultural life 
10 - Undermine cultural life 
Crime problems Immigrants increase crime problems 01 - Do not make it worse 
10 - Make it worse 
Welfare system Immigrants are a strain on welfare 
system 
01 - Are not a strain 
10 - Are a strain 
* In the EVS dataset lower values indicate the most anti-immigrant attitudes. For these analyses, 
these variables are recoded in a way that higher values indicate the most anti-immigrant attitudes. 
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To account for economic perceptions and conditions a dichotomous variable if a respondent is 
unemployed or not will be included. Next, confidence in parliament and confidence in government 
(both measured on a 4-point scale, from 'a great deal' to 'none at all') and evaluation of the current 
government (measured on a 10 point-scale, from 'very bad' to 'very good') are included to test the 
hypothesis about the radical right vote as a protest vote. To test the hypotheses about nationalism 
and European integration two variables will be included. First, nationalism (how proud are you to be 
a (country) citizen, measured on a 4 point scale, from 'not at all' to 'very proud'). Second, European 
unification (measured on a 10 point-scale, ranging from 'should gone further' to 'has gone too far').  
Furthermore, a variable will be included with the self-reported position of a respondent on the left-
right scale (measured on a 10-point scale, from 'left' to 'right') 
Last but not least, some socio-demographic characteristics are included: male gender, age (in 
years), highest education level (measured on a 8-point scale), annual household income (measured 
on a 12-point scale), and attendance of religious services (measured on a 7-point scale, from 'more 
than once a week' to 'never, practically never'). 
Independent variables for country level 
For the country levels I include the following variables in my model: unemployment level in 2008 and 
the relative number of immigrants in 2005. For unemployment and relative number of immigrants 
also the relative change compared to respectively 2007 and 2000 will be included. Unemployment 
figures are taken from the websites from Eurostat and Trading Economics (for Switzerland)5. Figures 
about immigrants are obtained from publications from the United Nations6.  
Results 
In appendix B descriptive statistics for the variables included in the models are given (for most 
variables the average and the standard deviation is given). The first thing that should be noted is the 
relatively high amount of respondents in the European Values Study who said they would vote if 
elections were held the next day. When these 'EVS-turnout' figures are compared with actual turnout 
figures of national elections 'EVS-turnout' is much higher (see table 3). Only for Turkey the difference 
is below five percentage points. For the other countries the difference is much higher. For France the 
difference is 29,3 percentage points and for Romania even 36,6 percentage points. This could 
influence especially the results of the logistic regression which compares radical right voters with 
citizens who abstain. This last group is either underrepresented in the sample of the EVS or 
                                                          
5
 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en and 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/switzerland/unemployment-rate 
6
 http://esa.un.org/unmigration/TIMSA2013/migrantstocks2013.htm?msax and World Population Policies 2005, 
UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
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Table 3. Turnout national elections and EVS results 
Country EVS Nat. elec. Year Difference 
Austria 84,8% 78,8% 2008 6,0% 
Belgium 96,1% 87,2% 2010 8,9% 
Bulgaria 69,0% 60,2% 2009 8,8% 
Denmark 97,3% 87,7% 2011 9,6% 
Finland 88,6% 70,4% 2011 18,2% 
France 89,5% 60,2% 2007 29,3% 
Germany 79,5% 70,8% 2009 8,7% 
Greece 88,8% 70,9% 2009 17,9% 
Hungary 74,2% 64,4% 2010 9,8% 
Italy 85,8% 80,5% 2008 5,3% 
Netherlands 88,0% 74,7% 2010 13,3% 
Poland 65,6% 48,9% 2011 16,7% 
Romania 75,8% 39,2% 2008 36,6% 
Slovakia 79,2% 58,8% 2010 20,4% 
Slovenia 73,8% 64,7% 2011 9,1% 
Switzerland 70,3% 48,6% 2011 21,7% 
Turkey 88,7% 87,2% 2011 1,5% 
Source election turnout: http://www.parties-and-
elections.eu 
 
respondents are less likely to admit 
they would not vote in elections. 
Further, we can see in the 
appendix that there are substantial 
differences between radical right 
support in the different countries. 
Support is highest in Switzerland (23%), 
Austria (19%) and  Finland (12%) and 
lowest in Wallonia, France and 
Germany (2%). Two remarks have to be 
made about vote intentions of 
respondents in the EVS. First, since it is 
not a focused electoral study actual 
electoral choices from respondents 
could be different if elections are held 
(much) later (Zhirkov, 2014). Second, since voting for radical right parties might be socially 
undesirable, respondents could decide not to answer they would vote for a radical right party 
(Vanhoutte & Hooghe, 2013). Also the fear levels between the countries differ quite substantial. Fear 
levels are highest in Finland, Slovenia and Turkey (with averages above 7) and lowest in Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Poland and Romania (with averages below 5,5).  
In table 4 the results of the two multilevel logistic regression analyses are given. The first 
model shows the radical right voters compared to voters for other parties. The second model shows 
the radical right voters compared to citizens who abstain. Below the results of both models are 
discussed7. 
Radical right voters versus other party voters 
As expected the fear scale has a significant influence in the model were radical right voters are 
contrasted with voters for other parties. A voter is 1,11 times more likely to vote for a radical right 
party if his or hers fear level increases with one unit. At the individual level most predictors have a 
significant effect in the expected direction based on the reviewed explanations. Only two predictors 
have an unexpected effect, because income and unemployment have an odds ratio of 1,00 and thus 
has no effect while a negative respectively positive effect was expected. Furthermore, two variables 
                                                          
7
 Some models were tested in which random slopes were used. Especially for predictors related to protest 
attitudes given the expectation given in the review part. Also models with whit random slopes for the fear scale 
were tested. Apart from some small details for the fear scale predictor, which are discussed in the section 
about the average fear scores for voters of different parties (page 21 and further), these test showed no 
reasons to include random slopes, so the models presented here have only a random intercept. 
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have an effect which is in the expected direction, but are not significant. These two predictors are 
nationalism and one of the anti-immigrant attitudes (crime problems). Given the consensus in the 
literature about anti-immigrant issues the fact that one of these items is not significant is surprising, 
but since the other three anti-immigrant attitudes are significant, there is no reason to doubt the 
relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for radial right parties. 
 
Table 4. Voting for Radical Right Parties 
 
Model 1: 
Vote for Radical Right Party versus 
vote for other party 
Model 2: 
Vote for Radical Right Party versus 
abstain 
Fixed effects 
 
95% C.I. for 
odds ratio 
 
95% C.I. for 
odds ratio 
 
Odds ratio 
 
Lower Upper Odds ratio 
 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 0,00 *** 
  
0,01 *** 
   
Level 1 predictors 
        Fear scale 1,11 *** 1,06 1,16 1,02
 
0,97 1,08
Male 1,51 *** 1,28 1,78 1,78 *** 1,45 2,19 
Age 0,98 *** 0,98 0,99 1,00 
 
0,99 1,01 
Education 0,93 ** 0,88 0,97 1,08 * 1,01 1,15 
Income 1,00 
 
0,96 1,05 1,06 
 
1,00 1,13 
Unemployed 1,00 
 
0,69 1,45 1,01 
 
0,65 1,55 
Distrust in parliament 1,24 *** 1,09 1,45 0,87 
 
0,73 1,02 
Distrust in government 1,34 *** 1,17 1,52 0,97 
 
0,82 1,15 
Evaluation government 0,91 *** 0,86 0,95 0,96 
 
0,90 1,02 
Nationalism 1,13 
 
1,00 1,27 1,45 *** 1,25 1,69 
Left right scale 1,31 *** 1,26 1,37 1,39 *** 1,32 1,47 
European unification 1,09 *** 1,05 1,12 1,04 
 
1,00 1,06 
Attendance religious services 1,09 *** 1,04 1,14 0,91 ** 0,86 0,97 
Immigrants - Jobs 1,06 ** 1,04 1,14 1,01 
 
0,96 1,06 
Immigrants - Cultural life 1,07 *** 1,03 1,11 1,01 
 
0,96 1,06 
Immigrants - Crime problems 1,04 
 
0,99 1,10 1,02 
 
0,96 1,09 
Immigrants - Welfare system 1,09 *** 1,05 1,15 1,06 
 
1,00 1,12 
 
Level 2 predictors 
        Unemployment 0,77
 
0,58 1,01 0,75 * 0,51 0,98
Unemployment change 0,98 
 
0,94 1,03 1,02 
 
0,97 1,07 
Immigrants 1,01 
 
0,92 1,11 0,97 
 
0,86 1,07 
Immigrants change 1,00 
 
0,99 1,01 1,00 
 
0,98 1,01 
- 
        Random effects Std. Dev.
   
Std. Dev.
   Intercept 0,81 
   
0,97 
   - 
        AIC 4548,4
   
2489,2
   BIC 4716,1 
   
2443,2 
   Deviance 4502,4 
   
2443,2 
   - 
        N 10.817
   
2.698
   Countries 18 
   
18 
   *** p <.001; ** p <.01; * p<.05 
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The other predictors show a significant effect in the expected direction and thus confirm what 
was mentioned in the literature review. The three other anti-immigrant attitudes (jobs, cultural life 
and welfare system) have a positive influence and are significant. Male, younger, less educated and 
less religious people are more likely to vote for radical right parties. Also people who have less 
confidence in parliament and government are more likely to vote for radical right parties. The odds 
ratio for the evaluation of government is below 1, but given the coding of this variable this means 
that people who are less satisfied with the current government are more likely to vote for radical 
right parties. The effect of the left-right scale predictor is relatively high and shows that, not 
surprisingly, voters who tend to see themselves are more right are more likely to vote for radical 
right parties. The same applies for voters who think that European unification has gone too far. At 
the second level the four predictors about unemployment and immigrants show that based on the 
odds ratio the effect of the current situation is stronger than the relative change compared to the 
past. However, the predictors at the second level are not significant. 
 
Figure 1. Effect of fear on voting for Radical Right Parties (P, with 95% C.I.) based on a Zelig 
simulation 
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Based on this model the effects of fear on the radical right vote is shown in more detail in 
figure 1. This figure shows two Zelig simulations (see Kosuke et al., 2008 & Kosuke et al., 2009). The 
first simulation shows the effect fear has on an average voter. In this simulation all the predictors 
have mean or typical values. The chance a fearless person would vote for a radical right party is 
approximately 2 percent. This chance slightly increases to 4,5 percent  for a fearful person. If we look 
at the second simulation, which shows the effect of fear for a potential radical right voter, the effect 
is stronger. The predictors in this simulation have values which are typical or average for an radical 
right voter (e.g. male, younger, less educated, stronger anti-immigrant attitudes). For this simulation 
the chance of voting for a radical right party increases from 15 percent for a fearless to 35 percent 
for a fearful person. 
Radical right voters versus citizens who abstain 
The second model in table 5 show a contrast between radical right voters and respondents who said 
they would not vote in elections. When radical right voters are compared with citizens who abstain, 
the influence of fear is only slightly positive. But it has no significant influence anymore. Also most 
other predictors at the individual level are not significant anymore in this model. Only four predictors 
stay significant and one predictor which wasn’t significant in the first model becomes significant in 
the second. This last predictor is nationalism which has a positive and relatively large odds ratio in 
this model. The predictors at the second level show a similar effect as in the first model, but again  
most of them are not significant. Unemployment levels in this model have a significant negative 
effect. 
In general, the results of the second model show that voters for radical right parties and 
citizens who would not vote in elections have more in common than voters for radical right parties 
have in common with voters for other parties. This is in contrast with findings from Zhirkov, who 
found that radical right voters are not only characterized by higher anti-immigrant attitudes 
compared to voters of other political parties but also compared to abstainers (Zhirkov, 2014).  
Fear levels for voters of different parties 
In figure 2 for each country the fear levels of voters for all national parties are shown8. This makes it 
possible to compare fear levels of voters of different parties within countries. The expectation would 
be that the voters of radical right parties have the highest average fear level. The parties are ordered 
based on their position on a left-right scale (based on expert surveys used by the European Values 
Survey)9 (EVS, 2011). In Austria, Denmark, Finland10, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Slovenia and 
                                                          
8
 In figure 2 abbreviations for the parties are used. In appendix C the full party names and the number of 
respondents who said they would vote for the party are given. 
9
 For some countries and political parties no placement on a left-right scale were given, these countries and 
parties are marked with a *. In countries were for none of the parties a left-right placement was given, parties 
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Switzerland the radical right parties indeed have the most fearful voters. Thus in two-thirds of the 
countries it is not the radical right party that has the most fearful voters. However, in most of these 
countries the voters for radical right parties still have relative high fear levels. In three countries only 
one other party has voters with higher fear levels and in three countries two other parties have 
voters with higher fear levels. And in some of these cases the confidence intervals of the parties 
having voters with higher fear levels are extremely high, due to the fact that only few respondents 
said they would vote for these parties. Thus, based on these countries one can also conclude that 
voters for radical right parties have relatively high fear levels compared to (most) other parties. Only 
in three countries the average fear level of voters for the radical right party are low compared with 
other parties. These countries are Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia. The question is whether there is 
an explanation for these deviating cases. 
In Bulgaria the radical right party is Ataka (Attack). Since 2007 public opinion research showed 
that support for Ataka declined (Smrčková, 2009: 61). On average respondents who said they would 
vote for Ataka had a fear level of 4.7. With an average score of 5.1 Bulgaria has the lowest average 
fear level of all countries included in the analysis (see appendix B). The expectation would still be that 
voters for the radical right party have the highest fear level. But this could  also be an indication that 
fear is less relevant in Bulgaria and therefore also a less important issue when it comes to party 
choice. Combined with a declining support for the party this could be a possible explanation of the 
unexpected findings in Bulgaria. However, based on the available data it is not possible to say if this 
mechanism really exist. Furthermore, Ataka is described as a party with a complex identity by Kristen 
Ghodsee (2008). She argues that the party combines both radical right and radical left elements. 
Therefore it could be that the average fear level of voters for the is lower than expected, because the 
party does not only attract  radical right (and based on the hypothesis fearful) voters. 
The radical right party in Slovakia is Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party, SNS) 
(average fear level of respondents: 5,4). Slovakia is also among the countries with on overall a 
relatively low fear level (5.5, see appendix B). When fieldwork for the EVS took place the Slovak 
National Party was part of the government coalition (Haughton & Rybář, 2008). This could be a 
possible explanation why the party did not attract fearful voters. If voters experience fear and hope 
for changes which would help take away their fear, it is less likely they would vote for a party which is 
part of the government coalition. Therefore it could be that fearful voters went to other parties. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
are ordered alphabetically. In countries were only for a few parties the left-right placement was missing, these 
parties are placed at the left. The radical right party in Romania (PRM) is placed more to the left. But in the 
documentation from the EVS it was mentioned that for this party it was difficult to place it on a left-right scale. 
10
 In Finland only respondents who said they would vote for other parties than the ones that were mentioned 
in the survey had higher scores on the fear scale. 
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Figure 2. Fear levels (with 95% C.I.) of voters for different parties7 
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In Hungary there are two radical right parties. One is the Magyar Igazsag es Elet Partja  
(Hungarian Justice and Life Party, Miép) with an average fear level of 7.1. The second one is a party 
which emerged after the decline of Miép (Halasz, 2009): Jobbik Magyarorszagért Mozgalom 
(Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik) with an average fear level of 6.7. Contrary to Bulgaria and 
Slovakia the average fear level in Hungary is relatively high (7.0, see appendix B). A possible 
explanation for the fact that in Hungary the most fearful voters say they would vote for other parties 
than the radical right parties could be - somewhat contradicting - the success of Jobbik. Because of 
the success of the party other parties adopt policies which are in line with the believes of Jobbik 
(Stadelmann, 2013). As a result it is possible that fearful voters therefore feel not only the radical 
right party can solve their problems, but that other parties can do the same. 
Despite these deviant cases, in general one could say the graphs in figure 2 support the main 
hypotheses that fearful voters are more likely to support radical right parties. 
Conclusion 
The main hypothesis which is tested in this paper is that voters who experience more fear are more 
likely to vote for radical right parties. The underlying idea for this hypothesis is that much of the 
explanations mentioned in the literature about the radical right vote are based on the experience of 
some sort of economic or symbolic threat. Research has shown that fear can influence people's 
decision-making and electoral behavior. The effect of such psychological factors received much less 
attention in relation to voting for radical right parties. This paper is set up as a first exploration of the 
effect of a general experience of fear on the radical right vote. 
To test the fear hypothesis data from the European Values Survey from 2008 was used. In this 
survey respondents were asked whether they were afraid of five different phenomena. At first sight 
these questions suggest two dimensions, a social and economic dimension. However, a principal 
component analysis and scale reliability showed high internal consistency between these five items. 
Therefore, together these items show a single underlying fear trait. This fear scale is included in two 
multilevel logistic regression models in which also other predictors for the radical right vote were 
included. In the first model radical right voters were contrasted with voters for other parties and in 
the second model radical right voters were contrasted with citizens who said they would not vote if 
elections were held. In the first model the fear scale had a significant and positive effect on the 
radical right vote. In the second model the fear scale had a very small effect and was not significant, 
suggesting that respondents who said they would not vote have more in common - when it comes to 
the experience of fear - with radical right voters than radical right voters and voters for other parties 
do. The findings of the positive effect of fear on the radical right vote found further support based on 
a Zelig simulation which showed that average voters were more likely to vote for a radical right party 
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when they become more fearful and other explanatory variables were held constant. This effect was 
even stronger for a typical radical right wing voter. Looking at the average fear levels of voters for 
different parties also showed that radical right parties often have support from one of the most 
fearful group of voters. These results show that a general feeling of fear indeed facilitates voting for 
radical right parties. 
However, as argued in more detail before, the way fear is measured in this study is not optimal. 
The questions which were used to create a fear scale may already have a right wing bias. 
Furthermore, the test which is used is not necessarily the best one to test whether fear as a 
personality characteristic facilitates voting for radical right parties. Next, this study uses self-reported 
vote intentions as a dependent variable. Another option would have been the use of evaluation 
scores of (radial right) parties. This would created more opportunities since all respondents would 
have evaluated radical right parties. However, to get a first impression of the role fear might play in 
facilitating voting for radical right wing parties it is sufficient. A general feeling of fear as a personal 
characteristic should be taken into account in further studies, but these studies should also find 
better ways to measure fear (for example by making use of experimental studies). 
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Appendix A) Principal component analysis and reliability scale per country 
Country PCA Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Components with 
eigenvalue above one Eigenvalue 
Percent explained 
variance  
Austria 1 3,334 66,7 ,875 
Belgium 1 3,007 60,1 ,833 
Bulgaria 1 3,218 64,4 ,860 
Denmark 1 3,246 64,9 ,864 
Finland 1 3,378 67,6 ,877 
France 1 3,137 62,7 ,850 
Germany 1 2,914 58,3 ,821    
Greece 1 3,403 68,1 ,882 
Hungary 1 3,002 60,0 ,831 
Italy 1 3,123 62,5 ,849 
Netherlands 1 3,056 61,1 ,841 
Poland 1 3,574 71,5 ,899 
Romania 1 3,378 67,6 ,880 
Slovakia 1 3,279 65,6 ,869 
Slovenia 1 2,871 57,4 ,813 
Switzerland 1 3,371 67,4 ,879 
Turkey * 1 3,258 81,4 ,924 
Total 1 3,253 65,1 ,865 
 
* In Turkey only four questions were asked (see also footnote 4). 
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Appendix B) Descriptive statistics 
Country N Valid N 
(listwise) * 
Would vote Vote RRP Abstain Fear scale Male Unemployed 
     
Mean Std. Dev. 
  Austria 1510 593 / 195 85% 19% 43% 6,2 2,5 43% 2% 
BE - Flanders 918 683 / 66 97% 8% 68% 5,9 2,1 49% 5% 
BE - Wallonia 591 410 / 18  95% 2% 23% 6,5 2,1 47% 8% 
Bulgaria 1500 372 / 171 69% 9% 14% 5,1 2,7 42% 9% 
Denmark 1507 876 / 87 97% 9% 73% 5,4 2,4 50% 2% 
Finland 1134 555 / 106 89% 12% 43% 7,1 2,2 49% 6% 
France 1501 1028 / 134 89% 2% 15% 6,7 2,2 46% 5% 
Germany 2075 932 / 218 79% 2% 6% 6,7 2,1 48% 11% 
Greece 1500 621 / 95 89% 3% 16% 6,5 2,4 43% 4% 
Hungary 1513 696 / 289 74% 3% 6% 7,0 2,3 48% 8% 
Italy 1519 466 / 94 86% 10% 28% 5,6 2,5 48% 7% 
Netherlands 1554 924 / 171 88% 11% 17% 5,6 2,0 45% 1% 
Poland 1510 407 / 219 66% 4% 5% 5,2 2,3 44% 7% 
Romania 1489 319 / 128 76% 6% 11% 5,3 2,6 44% 3% 
Slovakia 1509 332 / 110 79% 9% 19% 5,5 2,3 40% 6% 
Slovenia 1366 376 / 144 74% 11% 19% 7,1 2,1 46% 4% 
Switzerland 1272 450 / 228 70% 23% 32% 5,5 2,3 46% 2% 
Turkey 2384 695 / 185 89% 8% 26% 7,3 2,8 44% 14% 
Total 26352 10735 /2658  83% 8% 21% 6,2 2,5 46% 6% 
 
* Model 1 (Vote for radical right party vs. vote for other party) / Model 2 (Vote for radical right party vs. abstain). 
 
Country Age Education Income Distrust parliament Distrust government 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Austria 46,3 17,7 5,1 1,4 6,4 1,9 2,9 0,8 3,1 0,7 
BE - Flanders 49,0 17,6 4,9 2,0 7,2 1,9 2,7 0,7 2,9 0,7 
BE - Wallonia 46,5 17,2 4,9 2,0 6,9 1,8 2,6 0,8 2,9 0,8 
Bulgaria 50,2 17,7 5,3 1,8 2,3 1,2 3,4 0,7 3,3 0,8 
Denmark 49,8 16,8 5,1 1,8 8,0 1,9 2,2 0,7 2,5 0,7 
Finland 46,9 15,1 6,2 1,6 8,0 2,4 2,7 0,8 2,7 0,8 
France 50,0 18,4 5,0 2,1 6,8 1,9 2,6 0,8 2,9 0,8 
Germany 49,7 16,6 5,3 1,4 6,2 1,8 2,8 0,8 2,9 0,7 
Greece 49,6 18,4 4,3 2,1 5,2 1,7 2,9 0,8 3,1 0,9 
Hungary 44,6 17,6 4,8 1,6 3,6 1,0 3,1 0,8 3,2 0,8 
Italy 47,9 18,2 4,7 1,9 6,3 2,1 2,8 0,8 3,0 0,8 
Netherlands 54,8 17,3 4,8 2,0 7,3 2,1 2,6 0,7 2,6 0,7 
Poland 44,6 17,2 5,0 1,8 4,1 1,8 3,1 0,8 3,1 0,8 
Romania 48,1 17,3 4,7 1,8 3,0 1,8 3,0 0,9 3,0 0,9 
Slovakia 53,6 16,6 4,8 1,6 3,6 1,1 2,6 0,8 2,6 0,8 
Slovenia 48,5 18,1 4,7 2,2 5,7 1,9 2,6 0,7 2,7 0,7 
Switzerland 49,8 17,8 5,2 1,7 8,4 2,0 2,3 0,7 2,4 0,7 
Turkey 40,6 15,4 3,1 2,1 2,9 1,2 2,4 1,0 2,5 1,1 
Total 48,2 17,6 4,8 1,9 5,4 2,6 2,7 0,8 2,9 0,8 
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Country Evaluation 
government Nationalism Left - right scale European unification 
Attendance religious 
services 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Austria 4,6 2,2 3,3 0,8 5,2 2,0 6,9 3,0 4,8 1,9 
BE - Flanders 4,7 1,8 3,1 0,7 5,3 1,8 6,1 2,5 5,3 1,9 
BE - Wallonia 4,2 1,7 3,2 0,7 4,7 2,0 6,8 2,6 5,8 1,8 
Bulgaria 3,2 1,8 3,1 0,8 5,3 2,5 4,1 3,0 4,7 1,6 
Denmark 5,8 2,2 3,4 0,7 5,4 2,0 5,7 2,7 5,2 1,5 
Finland 5,6 2,1 3,5 0,6 6,0 2,4 7,1 2,6 5,5 1,5 
France 4,0 1,9 3,3 0,7 5,0 2,3 6,7 2,6 5,8 1,7 
Germany 5,3 2,0 2,9 0,8 4,8 1,7 6,6 2,7 5,5 1,7 
Greece 3,9 2,2 3,6 0,6 5,5 2,2 6,2 2,9 3,6 1,4 
Hungary 3,2 1,9 3,2 0,7 5,5 2,1 5,8 2,7 5,4 1,7 
Italy 3,9 2,1 3,3 0,8 5,3 2,4 6,0 2,8 3,7 1,8 
Netherlands 5,6 1,6 3,1 0,7 5,4 1,8 6,1 2,4 5,1 2,1 
Poland 4,4 2,0 3,5 0,6 6,0 2,0 4,8 2,6 2,9 1,5 
Romania 4,6 2,3 3,2 0,7 5,8 2,2 4,2 3,0 3,4 1,4 
Slovakia 5,5 1,9 3,3 0,7 4,9 2,0 5,1 2,6 3,9 2,2 
Slovenia 4,7 2,0 3,6 0,6 5,0 2,0 5,4 2,8 4,8 1,9 
Switzerland 6,4 1,9 3,3 0,7 5,2 1,8 5,9 2,7 5,3 1,8 
Turkey 4,8 2,3 3,7 0,6 5,9 2,4 5,4 2,8 4,0 2,2 
Total 4,7 2,2 3,3 0,7 5,3 2,1 5,8 2,9 4,6 2,0 
 
Country Immigrants 
Jobs 
Immigrants 
Cultural life 
Immigrants 
Crime problems 
Immigrants  
Welfare system 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Austria 6,4 2,9 6,4 2,9 7,6 2,5 7,5 2,6 
BE - Flanders 5,7 2,6 5,6 2,7 6,8 2,4 6,8 2,3 
BE - Wallonia 5,9 2,8 5,9 2,8 6,4 2,5 7,1 2,4 
Bulgaria 6,4 3,0 4,1 3,0 6,4 2,9 6,3 3,0 
Denmark 3,1 2,3 4,5 2,7 7,2 2,4 6,6 2,5 
Finland 4,9 2,8 4,0 2,7 6,9 2,4 6,5 2,4 
France 4,7 2,8 5,0 2,9 5,2 2,7 6,1 2,7 
Germany 6,4 2,6 6,0 2,6 7,5 2,3 7,6 2,4 
Greece 6,7 2,8 5,5 3,0 7,3 2,6 6,7 2,8 
Hungary 7,5 2,5 5,0 3,0 7,2 2,5 7,4 2,4 
Italy 5,4 2,8 4,9 2,9 7,3 2,5 6,1 2,7 
Netherlands 5,3 2,3 5,2 2,4 6,7 2,1 6,1 2,2 
Poland 5,5 2,7 4,4 2,7 5,6 2,5 6,1 2,5 
Romania 5,5 3,2 4,6 3,1 5,1 2,9 5,0 2,9 
Slovakia 6,4 2,6 4,6 2,8 6,8 2,3 7,0 2,3 
Slovenia 6,0 2,9 5,4 2,9 6,6 2,6 6,7 2,6 
Switzerland 4,9 2,5 5,0 2,6 7,0 2,3 6,7 2,4 
Turkey 6,9 2,7 6,6 2,7 6,6 2,7 6,7 2,6 
Total 5,8 2,9 5,2 2,9 6,7 2,6 6,6 2,6 
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Appendix C) List with parties from figure 2 
Country  Country N 
Abb. party Full party name Party N 
   
Austria 848 
BZÖ Alliance for the Future of Austria 49 
HPM Dr. Martin’s List - For Democracy, Control, 
Justice 
7 
FPÖ Austrian Freedom Party 109 
Other Other parties 18 
SPÖ Social Democratic Party of Austria 293 
ÖVP Austrian People's Party 200 
KPÖ Communist Party of Austria 11 
DG The Austrian Greens 133 
LF Liberal Forum 
 
28 
Belgium - Flanders 649 
MR Mouvement Réformateur 2 
VB Vlaams Belang 61 
LD Lijst Dedecker 37 
CD&V Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams  193 
Other Other parties 8 
VLD Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten Open 97 
SP.A Socialisten en Progressieven Anders  106 
N-VA Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 85 
Groen! Groen! 50 
SLP Sociaal Liberale Partij 5 
Ecolo Ecolo 4 
CHD Centre Démocrate Humaniste 
 
1 
Belgium - Wallonia 469 
CD&V Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams 3 
PTB-UA Parti du Travail de Belgique - Unité 
Antifasciste 
2 
FN Front National 8 
PS Parti Socialiste 165 
CDH Centre Démocrate Humaniste 84 
Other Other parties 9 
LiDé Libéral Démocrate 1 
MR Mouvement Réformateur 88 
Ecolo Ecolo  108 
Groen! Groen! 
 
1 
Bulgaria 741 
NVP Novoto Vreme (New Age) Party 3 
E-RP Euro-Roma party 6 
BRP Bulgarian Women's Party 4 
KPB Communist Party of Bulgaria 3 
DP Democratic Party 5 
VMRO-BND Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization - Bulgarian National 
Movement 
7 
DG-VMRO  George's Day Movement 2 
SDS Union of Democratic Forces 33 
BAPU-AS Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union 
Alexander Stambolijski 
4 
NDSV National Movement for Stability and 
Progress 
10 
BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party 191 
BSDP Bulgarian Social Democratic Party 26 
DPS Movement for Rights and Freedoms 94 
GERB Citizens for European Development of 
Bulgaria 
222 
Ataka National Union Attack 70 
ZPB Green Party of Bulgaria 8 
BAPU Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union 13 
Other Other parties 11 
DSB Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria 25 
SSD Union of Free Democrats 4 
 
Country  Country N 
Abb. party Full party name Party N 
   
Denmark 1236 
DF Danish Peoples Party 108 
SD Social Democrats 279 
EL Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) 23 
SF Socialist Peoples Party 251 
Venstre Venstre, Denmarks Liberal Party 377 
NA New Alliance (Liberal Alliance) 5 
KF Conservative Peoples Party 103 
RLP Radical Left Party 86 
KD Christian Democrats 
 
4 
Finland 714 
Other Other parties 11 
PS True Finns 89 
KD Christian Democrats  19 
VAS Left Alliance  40 
KESK Center party  99 
SDP Social Democratic Party 135 
RKP Swedish People's Party in Finland 13 
VIHR Green League 116 
KOK National Coalition Party 
 
192 
France 1040 
NF/NRM  Right Wing Extremist Parties (National 
Front, National Republicain Movement) 
26 
MPF Movement for France 30 
OLWP Other Left Wing Parties (Radical Leftist 
Party, Republicain's and Citizen's 
Movement) 
27 
HFNT Hunting, Fishing, Nature, and Tradition 29 
PCF Communist Party 44 
LWEP Left Wing Extremist Parties 
(Revolutionnairy Communist League, 
Labour Class Combat, Workers Party - PT) 
58 
OEP Other Environmentalist Parties 35 
PS Socialist Party 307 
Other Other parties 22 
UMP Union for a Popular Mouvement 237 
NC New Centrist Party 50 
LV Green Party 66 
MoDem Democratic Movement 
 
109 
Germany 1246 
DVU German People´s Party 5 
NPD German National Party 13 
Rep Republicans 8 
Other Other parties 21 
CDU/CSU Christian Democratic Party/Christian 
Social Union 
430 
FDP German Liberal Party  114 
PDS The Left/Party of Democratic Socialism  237 
SPD German Social-Democratic Party  287 
GP The Green Party 
 
131 
Greece 918 
KKE Communist Party of Greece 66 
LAOS Popular Orhtodox Rally  31 
PASOK Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement  324 
Other Other parties 96 
ND New Democracy 311 
SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left 90 
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Country  Country N 
Abb. party Full party name Party N 
   
Hungary 800 
KDNP Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt  20 
MKMP Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt 
Munkáspárt 
3 
Other Other parties 29 
Fidesz Fidesz Magyar Polgári Szövetség Fidesz 465 
MIÉP Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja  9 
FKGP Független Kisgazda és Polgári Párt  4 
JOBBIK Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom  16 
SZDSZ Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége  36 
MDF Magyar Demokrata Fórum  24 
MSZP Magyar Szocialista Párt  183 
CP Centrumpárt 
 
11 
Italy 772 
SVP Südtiroler Volkspartei (minoranza 
tedesca, con Partito Autonomista 
Trentino Tirolese) 
4 
LN Lega Nord (Bossi) 61 
FT Fiamma Tricolore - Destra Sociale 13 
FN Forza Nuova (non presente nelle due isole 
maggiori) 
4 
PdL Il Popolo della Libertà 202 
PCdL Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori (non 
presente al Sud e nelle isole) 
10 
ReC Rifondazione e Comunisti Italiani (Lista 
Anticapitalista) 
35 
UDC Unione di Centro (UDC-Rosa Bianca) 67 
PD Partito Democratico 269 
IdV-LDP Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro 68 
SL Sinistra e Libertà 23 
LB-P Lista Bonino-Pannella 14 
LDR Liberal Democratici Riformisti 
 
2 
The Netherlands 1130 
TON Proud of the Netherlands 92 
PVV Party for Freedom 37 
SP Socialist Party 136 
SGP Reformed Party  22 
CU Christian Union 61 
PvdD Party for the animals 25 
CDA Christian Democratic Party 301 
Other Other parties 6 
VVD Liberals 178 
PvdA Labour Party 189 
D66 Democrats 66 102 
GL Green/Left (GroenLinks) 
 
73 
Poland 668 
KPEiR National Party of Rentners and Pensioners 18 
URP Union of Real Politics 1 
LPR League of Polish Families 24 
PSL Polish Peasant Party 46 
PiS Law and Justice 157 
UPR Union of Work 5 
PK Party of Women  11 
SRP Self-defense  6 
PO Civic Platform  331 
SLD Union of Left Democracy  54 
PPP Polish Labour Party  4 
SDPL Socialdemocracy of Poland  4 
PD Democratic Party  7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Country  Country N 
Abb. party Full party name Party N 
   
Romania 655 
PNG-CD Partidul Noua Generatie-CrestinDemocrat 31 
PRM Partidul România Mare 36 
Other Other parties 16 
PC Partidul Conservator 14 
UDMR Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din 
România 
50 
PD-L Partidul Democrat-Liberal 244 
PSD Partidul Social Democrat 154 
PNL Partidul National Liberal 96 
PNCD Partidul National Crestin Democrat 8 
PIN Partidul Initiativa Nationala 
 
6 
Slovakia 688 
KSS Komunisticka strana Slovenska 16 
KDH Krestanskodemokraticke hnutie 73 
SF Slobodne forum  8 
LSHZDS Ludova strana-Hnutie za demokraticke 
Slovensko 
27 
SNS Slovenska narodna strana  64 
SMER SMER - Socialna demokracia 346 
SMK Strana madarskej koalicie 77 
ANO Aliancia noveho obcana  2 
Other Other parties 8 
SdkUDS Slovenska demokraticka a krestanska 
unia-Demokraticka strana  
 
67 
Slovenia 744 
SNS Slovenska nacionalna stranka 81 
SLS Slovenska ljudska stranka 59 
DSU Demokratska stranka upokojencev 74 
LDS Liberalna demokracija Slovenije 82 
LIPA LIPA 10 
SNP Stranka nove politike 72 
SD Socialni demokrati 172 
SDS Slovenska demokratska stranka 157 
Other Other parties 7 
NS-KLS Nova Slovenija - Kršcanska ljudska stranka 
 
30 
Switzerland 599 
TL Ticino League 2 
SD Swiss democrats 4 
FDU Federal Democratic Union 7 
SPP Swiss people party 126 
C-S Christian-social 5 
Rad Radicals 89 
SLP Swiss labor party 16 
CD Christian democrats 81 
Oth. Other parties 30 
GLP Green liberal party 26 
LP Liberal party 22 
SP Socialist party 129 
GP Green party 55 
EPP Evangelical People's Party 
 
7 
Turkey 1071 
CHP Republican People's Party  235 
DP Democrat Party  17 
MHP Nationalist Action Party  91 
DSP Demokratik Sol Parti  16 
BBP Great Union Party  3 
AKP Justice and Development Party  594 
SP Felicite Party  18 
Other Other parties 16 
DTP Democratic Society Party  76 
SHP Social Democrat People's Party  1 
ANAP Motherland Party  4 
 
